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Abstract: With the growth of presence based services, it is important to securely manage 
and distribute sensitive presence information such as user location. We survey techniques 
that are used for security and privacy of presence information. In particular, we describe 
the SIMPLE based presence specific authentication, integrity and confidentiality. We also 
discuss the IETF’s common policy for geo-privacy, presence authorization for presence 
information privacy and distribution of different levels of presence information to 
different watchers. Additionally, we describe an open problem of getting the aggregated 
presence from the trusted server without the server knowing the presence information, 
and propose a solution. Finally, we discuss denial of service attacks on the presence 
system and ways to mitigate them. 
1 Introduction 
Instant messaging and presence forms an integral part of Internet communications, both 
in corporate and consumer world [26]. A user’s presence information [13] includes his 
availability and willingness for communication. The main components of a presence 
service include presentity, watcher and presence server. A presentity is an entity such as a 
user, resource, service or application whose presence information is processed [13] and 
distributed. A watcher is an entity which requests presence information of a presentity. 
The presentity can generate presence information from various sources such as cell phone 
or PC client. The presence server (presence agent) combines the information to give a 
consistent view of the presentity status to the watchers.  
The privacy and security of presence information is important, especially if it contains 
sensitive information such as user location. The presentity specifies a set of rules known 
as presence authorization rules [15] to the server, so that the server can give different 
presence information to different watchers. A malicious user may snoop on the network 
to learn the sensitive presence information. To prevent this, the presence information 
needs to be stored and distributed securely. Secondly, only authorized watchers should 
receive presence information from the server. Lastly, the server must authenticate the 
presence sources of the presentity. 
This paper surveys presence security and privacy issues. It describes mechanisms defined 
by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [1] and SIMPLE [5] standards to deal with these 
issues. It does not discuss threat models and attacks except the DoS attack; however, we 
refer to specific attacks while describing different security mechanisms.  
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
background of a SIP/SIMPLE based presence system. Section 3 presents the security 
requirements for presence. Section 3.1 explains the presence identity model, Section 3.2 
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discusses authentication as a way to determine digital identity of a presentity and ways to 
achieve authentication in a presence system in different scenarios. Section 3.3 discusses 
presence source authorization, followed by presence data security in section 3.4. Section 
4 discusses presence privacy. Section 5 discusses trust in a presence system, followed by 
provider trust and anonymity from provider. Section 6 discusses denial of service attacks 
on the presence system, illustrating ways to mitigate it. Section 7 lists future work 
identified in this survey, followed by conclusion in Section 8 and references in Section 9. 
2 Background 
SIP [1], initially defined for managing multimedia sessions, and was extended by the 
SIMPLE working group of the IETF to compose and distribute presence information, 
which was later generalized to distribute generic events. The details about SIP request 
routing and the roles of different  SIP header fields like method type, “From” and “To” 
headers, “Contact” header is explained in detail in [1]. 
Watchers subscribe to presence information of presentities using SIP SUBSCRIBE [5] 
message and are notified about the state changes of presentities by SIP NOTIFY [5] 
messages. Presence data for presentity is published from multiple presence sources using 
SIP PUBLISH [14]. Diverse sources of presence information like wireline and wireless 
phones, applications like calendars and meeting maker applications and location sensors 
update presence information on the server using SIP PUBLISH. Fig. 1 shows the basic 
block diagram of presence system. 
 
             Figure 1 Basic block diagram of SIMPLE based presence system 
3 Presence System Security 
This presence information is critical and if compromised can be misused and potentially 
used for harmful purposes. The following are the security requirements for presence. 
- All presence sources must be authenticated before they can update presence 
information for a presentity. 
- Only authorized sources can update presence information for a presentity. 
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- Only authorized watchers can obtain the presence information based on the privacy 
filter of the presentity. 
- Watcher authorization should be based on privacy filter rules. 
- Only a presentity can create and modify its own privacy filter rules. 
- Presentities can specify privacy filters only after they are authenticated. 
- Confidentiality and integrity of presence information and privacy filters must be 
ensured.  
In the next section, we describe what an identity is in SIP based presence systems.  
3.1. Presence Identity Model 
In presence system, a unique identity is represented by a presentity. It is a principal which 
owns or manages a program, application or service. Identity of a user agent which 
updates its presence information and gets updated about others presence information 
must be determined. This is to identify who is the sender of a message and map the 
sending application or device to its principal. For example, when a message is received 
by a user candy@columbia.edu from bob@cisco.com, Candy knows that the identity 
bob@cisco.com maps to Bob who is her friend in Cisco.  
In SIP, the identity is expressed using SIP address-of-record (AOR), which is a SIP or 
SIPS URI present in “From” header of the request. RFC 3674 defines “An address-of-
record represents an identity of the user, generally a long-term identity, and it does not 
have a dependency on any device; users can move between devices or even be associated 
with multiple devices at one time while retaining the same address-of-record. A simple 
URI, generally of the form 'sip:egdar@example.com', is used for an address-of-record.”. 
When a SIP request is created by a user agent, it populates the AOR of target user in its 
“To” header field and Request-URI.  The AOR of the user that is sending the request 
populates the “From” header field of the message; the contact address of the device from 
which the request is sent is listed in the “Contact” header field. A SIP device (i.e., a user 
agent) is associating its own contact address with the user's address-of-record.  In doing 
so, the device is assuming the identity of the principal of the AOR and becomes eligible 
to receive requests that are sent to the AOR. 
A unique identity in a presence system is called presentity. The presentity is identified by 
an identifier which is a URI and generally of the form user@domain. It has a protocol 
specific prefix called scheme, e.g., pres:, imp:, sip: etc. The presence server owns the 
domain part and verifies the user identifier in its domain. The presence data model [17] 
discusses the presentity’s identity in detail. The draft specifies that “For each unique 
presentity in the network, there is one or more presentity URIs. Presentity may have 
multiple URI because they are identified by both a URI from the Presence (pres) scheme 
and a protocol specific URI, such as a SIP URI or an XMPP URI [20].  Or, it can be 
because a user has several aliases in a domain, all of which are equivalent identifiers for 
the presentity”. “Presentity URI is independent of any of the services or devices that the 
presentity possesses”.  Thus, a URI represents a resource which can be subscribed to 
obtain its presence information.  
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We consider the SIP address of record as the presentity’s identity. When a presence 
document is constructed, the presentity URI is set to the identifier used to request the 
document i.e.,  request URI in the SUBSCRIBE request. An identity in a presence system 
is established by the process of authentication. In the following section, we describe 
different mechanism to achieve authentication. Also, we describe authentication 
mechanisms in inter-domain and intra-domain scenarios. 
3.2. Authentication 
Authentication is the primary step in presence security and is used to verify the identity 
of a presentity. There can be varying degrees of authentication. Authentication authorizes 
a source to use a given identity, in this case to send PUBLISH and SUBSCRIBE 
requests, receive NOTIFY requests and update privacy filter rules using XCAP [21]. 
In the next section, we describe various mechanisms for authentication. 
3.2.1 Ways to Perform Authentication 
Presentities and watchers are authenticated by an authentication proxy server or a 
presence server using one of the following ways. 
Digest Authentication 
Presence uses SIP’s digest authentication. This mechanism is explained in RFC 2617 [4]. 
Details about using digest authentication for SIP messages is explained in Section 22.2-
22.4 of RFC 3261 [1]. The digest scheme is based on a simple challenge-response 
paradigm. It uses a nonce value to give the challenge. A valid response contains a 
checksum (by default, the MD5 checksum) of the username, the password, the given 
nonce value, the method type, and the requested URI. In a SIP network, the 
authentication takes place between the user agent client and the proxy or between a User 
Agent Client (UAC) and User Agent Server (UAS), where the server requires the user 
agent client to authenticate itself.  
For a UAC to UAS authentication, the authorization header is used. It consists of 
credentials containing the authentication information of the UAC. Specifically, It 
contains a hash generated using the nonce, the realm, the request method (the type of 
request message), the request-method version, and the authorization type. For, UAC to 
proxy authentication, proxy-authorization header is used. This header contains the type 
of authentication, credentials of the user agent, or the realm of the resource being 
requested. 
Example of Authorization header field; 
              Authorization: Digest username="bob", 
              realm="biloxi.com", 
              nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", 
              uri="sip:bob@biloxi.com", 
              qop=auth, 
              nc=00000001, 
              cnonce="0a4f113b", 
              response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", 
              opaque="5ccc069c403ebaf9f0171e9517f40e41" 
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            Figure 2 SIP authentication example 
Asserted Identity 
SIP servers assert the identity of authenticated users by inserting P-Asserted-ID header. 
The user in this case can be authenticated using the digest mechanism explained above. If 
the received request contains a P-Asserted-ID header field [2] and is received from a 
trusted proxy server, the request is considered authenticated. This mechanism is detailed 
in RFC 3325 [2] and is used within a trusted network. 
An example of asserted identity is given below.  
INVITE sip:vs2140@columbia.edu SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sipd.columbia.edu;branch=z8hy6 
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sipd.cs.columbia.edu:branch=u78Ty 
To: <sip:vs2140@columbia.edu> 
From: "Anonymous" <sip:anonymous@anonymous.invalid>;tag=9802748 
Call-ID: 24345456567787 
CSeq: 2 INVITE 
Max-Forwards: 69 
P-Asserted-Identity: "Abc" <sip:abc@xyz.com> 
Privacy: id 
Cryptographically Verified Identity 
For cryptographically verified identity, the request is authenticated if it contains an 
Identity header field as defined in SIP Identity draft [8]. The Identity header field 
validates the “From” header field of the request. The signature in the identity header is 
used to verify that the request legitimately came from this identity to be considered 
authenticated. 
SIP client SIP proxy 
SIP MESSAGE 




opaque="", stale=FALSE, algorithm=MD5  
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The signature is created using the AOR of the UA sending the message, the AOR  to 
which the request is being sent, the Call-ID header filed value, the CSeq header’s  digit 
(1*DIGIT) and method portions,  the Date header field value , the  Contact header field 
value and the content body of the message. The signature creation scheme is detailed in 
Section 9 of SIP Identity draft [8]. 
  An example of cryptographically verified identity message is given below. 
INVITE sip:bob@biloxi.exmple.org SIP/2.0 
Via: SIP/2.0/TLS pc33.atlanta.example.com;branch=z9hG4bKnashds8 
To: Bob <sip:bob@biloxi.example.org> 
From: Alice <sip:alice@atlanta.example.com>;tag=1928301774 
Call-ID: a84b4c76e66710 
CSeq: 314159 INVITE 
Max-Forwards: 70 
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2002 13:02:03 GMT 
Contact: <sip:alice@pc33.atlanta.example.com> 
Identity:"kjOP4YVZXmF0X3/4RUfAG6ffwbVQepNGRBz58b3dJq3prEV4h5Gn  
  4F6udDRCI4/rSK9cl+TFv45nu0Qu2d/0WPPOvvc3JWwuUmHrCwG 
             C+tW7fOWnC07QKgQn40uwg57WaXixQev5N0JfoLXnO3UDoum89 






o=UserA 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.example.com 
s=Session SDP 
c=IN IP4 pc33.atlanta.example.com 
t=0 0 
m=audio 49172 RTP/AVP 0 
a=rtpmap:0 PCMU/8000 
 
The original authenticator, which can be client’s local proxy server, forms the identity 
signature and adds an “Identity” header to the request containing this signature. It also 
adds an “Identity-Info” header. The Identity-Info header contains a URI by which its 
certificate can be acquired. Thus, the local domain proxy or the UA itself communicates 
to other entities that the request is authenticated. This mechanism can be used for end to 
end security and inter domain scenarios or if the users don’t have their own certificates. 
Certificate-based Authentication (S/MIME) 
The use of S/MIME is only possible if the end user agent has its own certificate. These 
certificates assert that the holder is identified by an AOR (user@domain portion of SIP or 
SIPS). The UserAgent’s (UA’s) certificates are also used to sign and encrypt SIP request 
message bodies. The bodies are signed using private keys of the sender and encrypted 
using the public key of receiver. Using S/MIME, sender can sign and encrypt the header 
of SIP message within MIME bodies of type “message/sip”. The main problem with this 
approach is creation and distribution of end user keys. This problem is addressed in the 
draft “Certificate Management Service for SIP” [25]. The certificate management service 
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stores the certificates and allows SIP UA’s to discover certificates of other users using 
SIP SUBSCRIBE with event “certificate”. 
Next, we describe ways to achieve authentication in intra-domain and inter-domain 
(multiple federations) scenarios. 
3.2.2 Authentication Scenarios 
 
   Figure 3 SIP authentication scenarios 
Figure 3 shows different SIP based authentication techniques when used in inter-domain 
and intra-domain scenario. A1 can be a proxy to which UA in domain A authenticate 
itself, requests from UA’s in domain A can be asserted by A1 before being sent to PA in 
domain A. Alternatively, the PA can authenticate the UA directly using the techniques 
specified above like digest, basic auth + TLS. PA in domain A can authenticate proxy or 
PA in domain B using TLS or Cryptographically Verified Identity. 
Intra-Domain Authentication 
In a single domain, the entities that want to communicate with the presence server are 
watchers, publishers, proxy servers and the XCAP server. XCAP clients need to 
communicate with the XCAP server. The watchers, publishers and the XCAP client have 
shared secrets which they can use to authenticate themselves. The servers use certificates 
to authenticate themselves to the clients. 
Inter-Domain Authentication 
In inter-domain or multiple federations, authentication is based on transitive trust. The 
UA (watcher or publisher) needs to authenticate itself to local presence server or 









UA in domain A 
Authenticator 





UA in domain B 
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TLS. The foreign domain (remote federation) presence server receives the SUBSCRIBE 
request from the local domain presence server or a proxy server. These messages identify 
the watcher in the local domain and are treated based on trust relationships between the 
domains or providers. The request must be sent to foreign domain presence server over a 
TLS connection, so that the foreign domain can authenticate the local domain’s proxy or 
presence server. 
3.3. Authorization 
Once authenticated, the entity is authorized to send and receive messages. However,  
presentity must authorize the watchers so that the server can distribute the presence 
information to them. This will be explained in more detail in Section 4. However, sources 
which update the presence information for a presentity must also be authorized. 
Unauthorized sources can publish incorrect presence information and make the presence 
state inconsistent. Currently, a source is authorized to update presence information if it 
has presentity’s credentials, in other words, it is based on authentication. The source must 
authenticate itself to use the identity of presentity, i.e., SIP AOR of presentity in the 
FROM header of SIP PUBLISH requests. In future, third party sources may be able to 
update presence information for presentity. In that case, the presentity will authorize each 
presence source using presence source authorization rules. If there are use cases which 
need third party PUBLISH, IETF may need to provide a specification to do this. 
Additionally for creating presence authorization rules using XCAP, it is required that the 
application must be authorized to create, modify or delete the rule. This authorization is 
based on authentication of XCAP client. There may be a requirement to give other 
entities authorization to create or change the authorization policy, e.g., manager doing for 
his employees, a parent for their children. 
3.4. Presence Data Security  
Presence data security implies ensuring confidentiality and integrity of presence data.  
We divide presence data security into two sections, namely, transport security and storage 
security. 
3.4.1 Transport and Network Layer Security 
Transport security must provide protection of presence data and messages from man-in-
middle attacks, replay attacks and to ensure confidentiality and integrity of presence data, 
presence requests and privacy filter documents (created using XCAP over HTTP).  It 
requires the usage of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [11] or Secure Multipurpose 
Internet Mail Extension (S/MIME) [10] or IP Security (IPSEC) [19]. 
Confidentiality 
This implies confidentiality of presence information contained in SUBSCRIBE, 
PUBLISH and NOTIFY requests and bodies, watchers and privacy filter rules, all of 
which are sensitive and must be stored and transported confidentially. Confidentiality of 
SIP messages and message bodies is discussed in 23.4.1.2 in the SIP specification [1]. 
XCAP clients should use HTTP over TLS for updating policy documents.  
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Integrity 
The publishing of presence information, subscribe and notification messages as well as 
privacy filter data must be protected against content modification on the network. The 
main goal is to protect against altered and injected messages. Integrity protection of SIP 
message headers and bodies is discussed in [1] in Section 23.4.1.1 and 23.4.2. 
The above goals can be achieved by using TLS, S/MIME or IPsec. SUBSCRIBE, 
PUBLISH or NOTIFY request cannot be encrypted as proxy servers may need to look at 
certain headers, but body of each of them should be encrypted. This can be achieved 
using S/MIME. The privacy filter rule must be updated over secure channel. This can be 
done using a TLS connection. TLS or S/MIME requires an administrative domain to have 
a certificate which includes a certification authority (CA) for issuing certificates to 
servers. In an intra domain scenario, a certificate issued by the local domain CA is 
accepted by all internal clients and servers. In inter-domain scenario, the CA must be 
trusted by both the parties or the certificates need to be signed by a trusted third party, a 
certificate signing authority. 
3.4.2 Storage Security (Securing Stored Presence Data) 
Data encryption prevents unauthorized access to presence data when stored at the server. 
This assumes the medium where the data is stored can potentially be compromised either 
physically or by a worm, a virus attack. Encrypting the data using a secret key can secure 
it even on insecure physical media. The encryption scheme, key deduction and other 
cryptographic details of encrypting the presence data in storage is beyond the scope of 
this survey. 
4 Presence Privacy 
Presence information like location and reachability is sensitive. This information must be 
distributed only to authorized watchers. The presentity must authorize the watchers using 
the authorization policy document. An authorization policy document contains the 
authorization rules and permissions specifying what parts of presence information can be 
sent to the watcher. The common policy draft [22] describes a framework for 
representing authorization policy, e.g., for geo-location and presence information. The 
authorization policy is created and modified by the presentity using XCAP or other 
offline mechanisms. In the next sections, we explain about privacy policy, presence 
authorization policy, location privacy and privacy filtering. 
Privacy Policy Requirements 
- Authorization of watchers before giving them presence information.  
- Selective notification: Presentity must be able to specify what parts of presence 
information are given to watchers. This can be based on time of day, etc. 
- Differential presence information: Presentity must be able to distribute different 
presence information to different watchers. 
- Provide capability for presentity to specify authorization policy for anonymous 
subscriptions. Watcher can hide his identity using anonymous. Mechanisms to 
achieve privacy in SIP are specified in RFC 3323 [6]. 
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- Local or national rules, e.g., E911 may override presentity’s authorization rules. 







































Figure 4 Presence processing data flow 
Presence Authorization Policy 
An authorization policy document contains a set of rules. Each rule contains conditions, 
actions, and transformations. Actions and transformations are together called as 
permissions. The conditions specify request attributes e.g., watcher identity and 
presentity state that should match, for the rule is to be applied.  The actions element tells 
the server what actions to take. Actions include rules like block, polite-block or allow for 
the watcher identities. If the action allows the request, the transformations determine how 
the presence data is modified before being presented to that watcher, and as such, defines 
a privacy filtering operation. 
The authorization policy itself is sensitive and can be used to tell if watcher is liked or 
disliked by the presentity. Thus, the policy document itself must be protected. The 
authorization policy document creation, modification and storage must be secure using 
authentication, encryption and integrity checks. We discussed in Section 2.4.1 ways to 
protect confidentiality and integrity of policy documents.  
Privacy Filters 
Privacy filtering step is invoked in the presence data processing after the composition 
step as shown in Figure 4. A candidate presence document is generated as a result of 
composition operation. Privacy filters are applied to provide selective access of presence 
data. The presence authorization rules [15] and geo-privacy [18] specify these filters for 
selective access to the presence and location data. Authorization rul
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time of day, location, identity. They specify permissions, i.e., actions and transformations 
for different parts of presence data. Some examples of permissions include <provide-
devices>, <provide-services>, <provide-persons>, <mood>, <place>, <place-type>, 
<relationship>, <status-icon>, <activities>. The effect of these permissions is 
availability of mood, place, place-type, etc., in the final presence document which is sent 
to the watchers.  “Sub-handling” can be used to deny or allow subscription request based 
on matched conditions. “Block” tells the server to place the subscription in the rejected 
state. “Confirm” tells the server to place the subscription in the "pending" state, and wait 
for input from the presentity to determine how to proceed. “Polite-block” tells the server 
to place the subscription into the "accepted" state, and to produce a presence document 
that indicates that the presentity is unavailable. “Allow” tells the server to place the 
subscription into the "accepted" state and send presence notification based on other 
permissions. 
A sample Presence authorization rule from [15] is below. 
<provide-devices> 
   <device-id>urn:uuid:f81d4fae-7dec-11d0-a765-00a0c91e6bf6</device-id> 
   <class>biz</class> 
</provide-devices>. 
The watcher receives presence information containing device-id or device family 
specified in the rule. 
Location Privacy  
Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized access. The 
requirements for location privacy are detailed in RFC 3693 [3]. 
Distribution of location information must also use authentication, confidentiality and 
integrity checks. The mechanisms to do so can be in transport protocol or in presence 
location object itself. The issues concerning location information are mainly related to (i) 
location information collection (ii) location information retention and (iii) location 
information distribution and use. These issues are addressed by geo-privacy [18] to an 
extent. The geo- privacy [18] rules specify the conditions and permissions that allow a 
presence server (Location Server (LS)) to distribute location information to watchers with 
different amount of location precision. Example of a location filter is "give my location to 
my family to a resolution of one km and to my friends to a resolution of five km”. It also 
specifies rules specifying if this location information can be retained and for how long as 
well as if it can be further distributed. 
Like presence policy, geo-privacy’s conditions and transformations restrict access to 
location and are specified in [18]. One example of geo-privacy condition match is <civic-
loc-condition> element matches. This happens only when the current location of the 
target matches all the values specified in the child elements of this element as shown in 
example below. The civic location transformation can be specified by means of the 
<civic-loc-transformation> element to restrict the level of civic location information 
which the LS is allowed to provide.  From lowest to highest level, the names of these 
levels are: 'null', 'country', 'region', 'city', 'building', 'full', depending on which the 
presence location information distributed can be complete (full) or none (null). Each level 
has a set of civic location data items such as <country> and <A1>... <A6>, as defined in 
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[23].  Similarly, geospatial location transformation can be specified by means of the 
<geospatial-loc-transformation> element to restrict the resolution of the geospatial 
location information to the value provided in the <latitude-resolution>, <longitude-
resolution> and <altitude-resolution>, child elements of the <geospatial-loc-
transformation> element. 
 
 Sample Geo-Privacy Rule from [18] 
   <cp:rule id="AA56i09"> 
 <cp:conditions> 
              <cp:validity> 
                    <cp:from>2004-11-01T00:00:00+01:00</cp:from> 
                    <cp:until>2005-11-01T00:00:00+01:00</cp:until> 
              </cp:validity> 
              <gp:civic-loc-condition> 
                    <gp:country>DE</gp:country> 
                    <gp:A1>Bavaria</gp:A1> 
                    <gp:A3>Munich</gp:A3> 
                    <gp:A4>Perlach</gp:A4> 
                    <gp:A6>Otto-Hahn-Ring</gp:A6> 
                    <gp:HNO>6</gp:HNO> 
                </gp:civic-loc-condition> 
 </cp:conditions> 
  <cp:actions/> 
            <cp:transformations> 
              <gp:distribution-transformation>true 
    </gp:distribution-transformation> 
              <gp:keep-rules-transformation>true 
                </gp:keep-rules-transformation> 
              <gp:civic-loc-transformation>full 
                 </gp:civic-loc-transformation> 
               <gp:geospatial-loc-transformation> 
                    <gp:lat-resolution>0.00001 
   </gp:lat-resolution> 
                    <gp:lon-resolution>0.00001 
   </gp:lon-resolution> 
                </gp:geospatial-loc-transformation> 
 </cp:transformations> 
       </cp:rule> 
Notifier Privacy Mechanism 
The presence server must respond to subscription requests such that it does not reveal any 
presence information, nor reveals level of filtering used for that watcher. The 
SUBSCRIBE response message codes, e.g., 200, 202, 400 or 600; reveal different 
information to the watcher about presentities authorization rules. Information about 
whether a user is authorized to subscribe to the requested state should never conveyed 
back to the original user. 
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5 Trust and Anonymity 
Trust extends from Identity (Authentication) 
A user is trusted by the presence server if he possesses the shared secret credentials and 
can authenticate him using them. Trust association is on a per message basis. Trust in 
inter-domain scenario is achieved using inter-domain authentication mechanism as 
described in section 2.2.1. Even though the client and server authenticate each other, it is 
the client who trusts the server and gives it presence data. The real trust is client’s trust on 
the server’s identity and not the server proving its identity.  
Provider Trust  
The presentity’s principal has no way to ensure if the provider fully protects its presence 
information or this information is compromised by the provider either knowingly or 
unknowingly. Importantly, presentity might not want the service provider to know its 
presence information.  
One potential solution which can be explored to deal with this issue is to use Peer-to-Peer 
based presence distribution where each p2p enabled UA acts as presence agent. In this 
case, there is no single server which has the entire presence document, but a random peer 
may have the presence document or a part of it. The watcher and notifier UA perform 
distributed processing of presence information. P2P based management and distribution 
of presence information is an area for further research. 
 
   Figure 5 Presence service provider trust 
Anonymity from Provider 
“My presence information must not be compromised. Is my availability information 
really private? Can the Provider target advertisement on me? How much does my 
provider know about me?” These issues require that presence information remain 
anonymous from the presence server. This creates a requirement that the presence agent 
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know the actual information. This problem and our proposed solution are explained 
below. 
Problem Statement 
A Presence server must be able to perform basic composition and filtering without 
actually getting the presence information. To do this, the server should be able to process 
the PIDF just by looking at XML tags without being able to see the data within the XML 
tags. The value inside the tags needs to be encrypted and clients who possess the right 
keys will be able to know the information within the XML tags. In other words, we want 
to get the server based services like aggregation, filtering and distribution without 
actually revealing any presence information to the provider. The server is assumed to be 
trusted to distribute the presence data. The objective is to achieve anonymity or hiding 
the presentity’s presence information from the server. 
There can be various scenarios in which this can be useful. Before describing the solution 
we list our assumptions for the solution. 
Assumptions 
All watchers are authenticated not by the presence server itself but by third party 
authenticator (authentication service). This ensures presence server does not indulge in 
anomalous behavior by enacting as another watcher who is authenticated by server itself, 
to get the presence information and its unauthorized distribution. Watchers can also be 
authenticated by presentity itself using certificates signed by a trusted CA. A trusted 
server will not pose as authorized watcher and try to get presence information. To prevent 
this we propose use of authentication service.  
Participating entities have public key of other entities like watchers, presentity and 
presence server which is originally distributed using some public key distribution 
mechanism. 
Proposed Solution 
The idea is to have a shared key between the presentity and the watcher which is not with 
the server. Parts of XML (PIDF based presence data) will be encrypted using the shared 
key. This can only be decrypted by the watchers as only they have the shared key. 
 There are two variants of the solutions. In the first variant, both the watcher and 
presentity have a shared session key. The shared session key is given to authorized 
watchers to decrypt the encrypted data within the XML tags. In the second variant, we 
give each presentity another set of (public, private) key pair, public key of which is given 
to each authorized watcher. Thus, presentities have two sets of keys. First set is the 
public-private key pair used by the presentity and is installed using some PKI distribution 
mechanism. Let’s call this as (Pu1, Pr1). The second set is self generated (public, private) 
key pair to be used only for presence purposes, specifically to solve this problem. Let’s 
call this as (Pu2, Pr2). The second key pair is used for encrypting and decrypting 
presence information and can be used to generate the session key. Since, a shared session 
key is cheaper and can be used to achieve the same purpose, we need not use a public-
private key pair based variant of solution, instead use a session key based solution. 
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When a SUBSCRIBE message is received from an authenticated watcher, the presentity 
sends its shared session key (or the presence public key (Pu2)) encrypted using public 
key of the watcher. Only watchers can get this key and not the presence server or any 
other entity as it encrypted using watcher’s public key. The data within the XML tags is 
encrypted using this shared session key (or presence private key (Pr2) of presentity). 
Higher layer XML tag names and attributes remain unencrypted and are assumed to be 
sufficient for composition and basic filtering operations by the presence server. Once the 
presence server performs data processing operations it encrypts the presence data for each 
watcher using the public key of the watcher and sends notification messages. Watchers 
decrypt the presence data, first using their private keys and then using the shared session 
key (or the presence public key (Pu2)) given by the presentity initially.  
The presentity creates an internal subscription or the watcher SUBSCRIBE’s for changes 
in key as shown in figure 2 below, so that presentity sends a NOTIFY message with the 
shared key whenever the shared key changes. 
 
  Figure 6 SIMPLE messages and Key distribution   
 
Fig. 2 above shows the distribution of keys and message exchanges. The figure shows 
that the keys are directly sent to watchers. Even if NOTIFY is not directly delivered, the 
keys are sent encrypted using the public key of watcher and can be decrypted only by the 
watcher who has the correct private key. 
6 Denial of Service  
We explained the mechanism to achieve confidentiality and integrity, anonymity and 
trust in presence systems. Denial of service attacks (DoS) affect the availability of the 
presence service. DoS attack can be centralized or distributed (DDoS) launched either on 
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A presence service generates multiple NOTIFY messages for each PUBLISH message. 
Each message causes twice the number of filtering operations (one for privacy filter and 
second for watcher filtering). Therefore, PUBLISH messages arriving at a very high rate 
can cause a large number of NOTIFY generation which can cause network congestion 
and server overloading. To prevent bogus PUBLISH messages causing network or server 
overload, PUBLISH requests should be authenticated before being processed. 
Processing of a SUBSCRIBE message involves authentication, authorization and filtering 
operations to generate the NOTIFY message. A large number of SUBSCRIBE requests 
with bogus authentication details can also lead to DoS attack on the server. 
Attackers can modify the “From” SIP header to have the address of another user agent; 
so that the response will be sent to that user agent. This could cause DoS attack on that 
user agent by generating unsolicited notifications. This needs to be prevented by 
authentication and return routability verification. 
Man-in-the-middle attacks using SUBSCRIBE could create arbitrary subscriptions, 
hijack existing subscriptions, terminate outstanding subscriptions, or modify the resource 
to which a subscription is being made.  To prevent such attacks integrity protection 
across "Contact", "Route", "Expires", "Event", and "To" headers of SUBSCRIBE 
messages must be provided.  
A change in authorization policy requires re-evaluating authorization status of existing 
subscriptions. Hence, another form of DoS attack can be launched if an adversary can 
modify authorization policy document. Hence, the presence user agent must be protected 
from getting compromised and authorization of XCAP requests to change policy 
document must be done. 
7 Future Research Work 
Presence source authorization rules need to be defined. It depends on use cases or 
requirements for presence source authorization. Similarly, requirement for XCAP source 
authorization can be evaluated. 
A peer to peer based presence data processing and distribution system can be developed. 
This p2p system may also help to achieve presence data anonymity from provider. The 
solution can be as simple as p2p storage of presence data to as complex as distributed 
presence data processing, e.g., distributed presence composition. 
Further work is possible on detection and prevention of denial of service attacks, detailed 
analysis of privacy implications of presence data, analysis of threat models and attacks on 
presence system. 
8 Conclusion  
In this survey paper, we described a complete architecture to ensure security and privacy 
of presence information. We explain mechanisms to ensure authenticity, confidentiality 
and integrity of presence requests (PUBLISH, SUBSCRIBE and NOTIFY) and privacy 
filter update requests (XCAP). We also described technologies and protocols that can be 
used to perform authentication of different entities in inter-domain and intra-domain 
scenarios. Secure transmission of presence data can be achieved using IPsec and TLS 
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protocols. Privacy mechanisms for access control and filtering using the common policy, 
presence authorization rules and geo-privacy is described. We discuss provider trust and 
anonymity and propose a solution for it which can be further worked on. Finally, we 
discuss denial of service attacks that might affect the availability of presence service and 
ways to minimize the impact of such an attack. 
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